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MOTIVATING CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE 
Erica Hashimoto* 
Abstract 
Some constitutional rights of criminal defendants lend themselves to 
systematic violations at the trial level. In particular, state officials may 
gravitate toward such violations when (1) the nature of the relevant right 
renders violations difficult to detect at the trial level, and (2) 
constitutional compliance imposes especially high costs. For rights with 
those two characteristics, a trial-level remedy may not adequately protect 
the right, and a robust appellate remedy may be necessary to provide an 
adequate incentive for constitutional compliance. But because the Court 
has not considered the importance of deterring constitutional violations 
outside of the exclusionary rule context, it has significantly limited the 
availability of appellate remedies. As a result, states have an incentive to 
violate these high-cost constitutional rights in situations where the 
violation is unlikely to be discovered. The Strickland right to effective 
assistance of counsel provides a paradigmatic, and widespread, example 
of the breakdown in remedies where constitutional violations are both 
hidden at the trial level and cost effective for state actors.  
This Article argues that as to this category of constitutional violations, 
the Court should reformulate remedies to foster meaningful compliance 
with critical constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants. 
At the very least, the Court should put in place strengthened remedies if 
the defendant can establish that a state both has abridged a constitutional 
right and has a custom of doing so. Only by embracing this new remedial 
approach can the Court close the gap between its articulation of 
theoretical individual rights and the real-world incentives of states to 
violate certain constitutional rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
State officials, including law enforcement officers and prosecutors, 
have significant incentives to respect many constitutional rights 
guaranteed to criminal defendants because the U.S. Supreme Court has 
created costly remedies for violating those rights. Because many 
constitutional violations can be easily detected, trial-level remedies 
provide a sufficient incentive for state actors to comply with those rights. 
But trial-level remedies may be insufficient to deter violations of high-
cost constitutional rights that are difficult to detect, such as violations of 
the right to effective assistance of counsel or the right to a fair and 
impartial jury. And because the Court has only considered the importance 
of deterring constitutional violations in the context of the exclusionary 
rule, it has provided little in the way of appellate remedies for trial-level 
violations of constitutional rights.  
The Court has specifically tailored the exclusionary rule remedy to 
provide law enforcement officers with an incentive to comply with 
defendants’ constitutional rights.1 To put it another way, the Court has 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (noting that the exclusionary 
rule “operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
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provided trial courts with the capacity to remove any incentive for law 
enforcement to violate constitutional rights by eliminating any benefit 
law enforcement might gain from such violations.2 Because this remedy 
focuses exclusively on motivating compliance with constitutional rights, 
the Court has limited it to situations in which providing a remedy will 
have the greatest probability of deterring constitutional violations.3 Thus, 
the Court has created exceptions to the exclusionary rule for situations in 
which the remedy “does not result in appreciable deterrence.”4  
By contrast, the Court has never explicitly considered the importance 
of deterring constitutional errors that occur during the trial process itself. 
Most of these errors, however, generally are readily correctable at the trial 
level. After all, defense counsel can object to the violation of most of 
these rights, and trial courts can either prevent or correct any 
constitutional error. As to these rights, the primary incentive for 
compliance lies in the fact that state actors recognize the likelihood that 
constitutional error will be corrected—occasionally at significant cost to 
the case—thereby eliminating any potential benefit to the state from the 
error and providing an affirmative incentive for constitutional 
compliance.5 The perceived adequacy of that structure assuring 
                                                                                                                     
generally through its deterrent effect’”); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (noting 
that “the ‘prime purpose’ of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future unlawful 
police conduct’” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974))); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule prohibiting admission at trial of 
unconstitutionally seized evidence applies to the states). 
 2.  Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (concluding that the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule “is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it”). 
 3. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (observing that “[a]s with any remedial device, the 
application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial 
objectives are thought most efficaciously served”). 
 4. Janis, 428 U.S. at 454; accord Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (holding that providing a remedy 
where law enforcement officers acted in good faith reliance on a search warrant that later proved 
to be defective would not provide any incentive to comply with the Constitution because the 
officers had believed that they were in compliance).  
 5. For instance, if the state introduces a testimonial hearsay statement against a defendant 
in clear violation of her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, see Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004), that error will be obvious to defense counsel and the trial 
judge, making it unlikely that the prosecutor will gain any benefit from violating the right. In 
addition, because the trial judge could grant a mistrial based upon the constitutional violation, 
prosecutors have an affirmative incentive to comply with the constitutional right. Cf. Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 128–37 (1968) (rejecting the argument that “the right to 
confrontation could be avoided by the instruction to the jury to disregard the inadmissible hearsay 
evidence” based on the “threats to a fair trial” inherent in the admission of a co-defendant’s 
extrajudicial confession); United States v. Doherty, 233 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
admission of such testimony is error precisely because ‘the jury can [not] possibly be expected to 
forget it in assessing the defendant’s guilt.’” (alteration in original)). 
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constitutional compliance before trial courts has prevented the Court 
from explicitly considering the importance of providing an incentive for 
constitutional compliance.6  
Because the Court has not considered the importance of providing 
incentives for constitutional compliance in the context of these rights, 
appellate remedies have been limited to instances in which the fairness of 
the proceedings and the reliability of the outcome have been 
compromised.7 For most constitutional rights, this remedial scheme 
provides sufficient incentives for constitutional compliance to prevent 
widespread violations of constitutional rights.8 But not for all. One 
particular category of rights arising after initiation of trial court 
proceedings has both escaped remedy and been subject to systemic 
violations. This category includes rights with two distinctive 
characteristics: (1) violations are hidden (or at the very least not obvious) 
at the trial court level, and (2) they are high-cost rights, or, to put it 
another way, the state has strong incentives to violate them. For this 
category of constitutional rights, trial courts cannot sufficiently 
incentivize constitutional compliance, and a more robust appellate 
remedy therefore is needed. But because the Court has never recognized 
the importance of deterrence for these violations, remedies have remained 
elusive. 
The right to the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 
Washington9 provides a paradigmatic example.10 The Court held in 
Strickland that defendants have a constitutional right not only to counsel 
but also to the effective assistance of counsel.11 But these ineffective 
assistance errors tend to remain hidden at the trial level. After all, defense 
lawyers have little to no incentive, or perhaps lack the self-awareness, to 
raise their own ineffectiveness. Because defense counsel serve as the 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (“[B]ecause we presume that the 
lawyer is competent to provide the guiding hand that the defendant needs, the burden rests on the 
accused to demonstrate a constitutional violation.” (internal citation omitted)).  
 7. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 8. To be sure, this remedial scheme, which provides only limited remedies for 
constitutional rights, has been the subject of much criticism. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., 
Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced 
Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 172 (1991) (observing that “even the accused have rights 
and that only automatic reversal can fully vindicate such rights”). Broader remedies likely would 
incentivize greater constitutional compliance, but most constitutional rights do not lend 
themselves to widespread, systematic violations, and the current remedial scheme likely assures 
compliance with many rights. 
 9. 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 685–86.  
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primary protectors of their clients’ rights,12 a lawyer’s failure to function 
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment likely will go unnoticed at 
the trial level. In addition, providing effective assistance of counsel to all 
defendants who are entitled to counsel is an incredibly expensive 
proposition for state and local jurisdictions.13 As a result, local and state 
jurisdictions have strong incentives to cut corners on indigent defense if 
they think there will be no consequence to those decisions.  
Because the Court, in crafting appellate remedies for constitutional 
rights that arise after the initiation of criminal proceedings, has focused 
entirely on fair trial concerns, it has never considered the importance of 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 732 (2007) (“There is, 
perhaps, no right as fundamental to the defendant as the right to have the assistance of an effective 
attorney, because that attorney is the conduit through which all other constitutional rights are 
asserted.”); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 93 (1995) (“Nevertheless, . . . attorneys were taught to keep in 
sight one central goal, namely, to provide the best possible representation for each client by 
ensuring that all his constitutional rights were vindicated throughout the criminal justice 
process.”). 
 13. States vary regarding the entity that has to provide the funding for indigent defense 
systems. In some states, the state itself funds indigent defense. See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 53 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE 
DENIED] (“[T]he majority of states (28) now essentially fully fund indigent defense (i.e., provide 
more than 90% of the funding).”); State Indigent Defense Systems, SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR. (last 
visited July 1, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/the-right-to-counsel/state-indigent-defense-
systems/ (listing the percentage of state funding for indigent defense in every state as of 2013). In 
other jurisdictions, states provide some of the funding and local or county jurisdictions provide 
the rest. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra, at 54 (“Five states provide between 50% and 85% of the 
funds required for indigent defense, and 16 states shift the burden of over half the funding to the 
counties.”); see also Justine Finney Guyer, Note, Saving Missouri’s Public Defender System: A 
Call for Adequate Legislative Funding, 74 MO. L. REV. 335, 342 (2009) (noting that while 
Missouri’s public defender system is technically state funded, counties are responsible for funding 
public defender office space and utilities). Additionally, in a handful of jurisdictions, primary 
responsibility for indigent defense representation still lies with local or county jurisdictions. See 
JUSTICE DENIED, supra, at 54 & n.31 (noting that while only two states require counties to fund 
all indigent defense expenses, an additional six states contribute less than ten percent of indigent 
defense funding); see also Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality 
and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 242–43 (2010) (explaining that 
most of the funding for indigent defense in Arizona comes from county general funds). Finally, 
in many states, local jurisdictions are responsible for providing counsel in misdemeanor cases, 
particularly local code offenses although sometimes also for state misdemeanors. See, e.g., HOLLY 
R. STEVENS ET AL., STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 
FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 28 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/leg 
al_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_expenditures_fy08.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that in 
Kansas, the state funds felony criminal defense, but counties provide the funding for misdemeanor 
and juvenile cases). 
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providing a remedy to motivate constitutional compliance.14 In particular, 
the Court has limited the appellate remedy for Strickland violations to 
defendants who can establish a reasonable probability of a different result 
absent counsel’s errors.15 The result has been widespread violations of 
the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at the trial 
level.16  
To be sure, most jurisdictions comply with their constitutional 
obligations. But not every jurisdiction does. And the problem is that the 
criminal justice system relies primarily (if not exclusively) on the good 
faith of state or local governmental actors operating within the system. 
None of the other potential external mechanisms for assuring 
constitutional compliance—federal habeas; the federal civil damages 
remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; state habeas and tort remedies; and 
ethical rules—adequately affect the conduct of governmental officials.  
Because this particular category of constitutional rights defies 
constitutional compliance, this Article argues that the Court should create 
a more robust appellate remedy in certain cases. In jurisdictions that have 
demonstrated disregard for a constitutional right, the Court should require 
a reversal remedy where a defendant can establish (1) that the state did 
not comply with its constitutional obligations and (2) that the state had a 
custom of violating this constitutional right. Such a remedy would 
provide state actors with an incentive for constitutional compliance that 
has been absent in the past. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the exclusionary 
rule and its deterrent effect. Part II identifies a category of constitutional 
rights that lend themselves to widespread, systematic violations and 
focuses on the importance of deterring those constitutional violations. 
Part III discusses the ineffectiveness of other remedies that might 
incentivize constitutional compliance. Finally, Part IV proposes a 
remedial modification for this category of constitutional rights—
specifically, a new systemic remedy for the failure to comply with the 
Constitution when there is evidence of a custom of constitutional non-
compliance. 
I.  DETERRENCE AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE  
The Supreme Court has recognized that certain constitutional rights—
the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unconstitutional searches 
and seizures, the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and the Sixth 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684–85. 
 15. Id. at 694. 
 16. See infra Section II.B (discussing the result of limiting appellate remedies for 
constitutional errors).   
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Amendment right to counsel during interrogation—would mean little 
absent some mechanism for enforcing those rights. In crafting those 
remedies, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
deterring unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement officers.17 It 
therefore has designed a remedial scheme to incentivize law enforcement 
to comply with constitutional requirements.18 In particular, the Court has 
tailored the exclusionary rule to provide incentives for state actors 
(primarily law enforcement officers) to respect defendants’ constitutional 
rights.19  
                                                                                                                     
 17. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995) (“[T]he exclusionary rule was 
historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct . . . .”); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 263 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he exclusionary rule was adopted to deter unlawful 
searches by police.”); see also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic 
Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 53 (2010) (“The benefit of deterring police misconduct was not among the 
original justifications presented for the exclusionary rule in Weeks. . . . [H]owever, 
deterrence . . . is now considered the only benefit and purpose of the exclusionary rule.”); Ruth 
W. Grant, The Exclusionary Rule and the Meaning of Separation of Powers, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 173, 181–84 (1991) (describing the rise of the deterrence rationale in the Court’s decisions 
concerning the exclusionary rule); James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of 
Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1819, 1858–59 (2008) (“The prevailing 
understanding of the exclusionary rule is that it is a constitutionally required deterrent of future 
unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the accepted wisdom, the rule eliminates 
incentives for illegality by denying officers the profits of their illegal acts.” (internal citation 
omitted)).  
The Court has treated statements slightly differently than searches, holding that the 
constitutional violation in cases where law enforcement has failed to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirements occurs at the time of the illegal search, whereas the constitutional 
violation in cases in which police fail to comply with Miranda occurs when any statement is 
introduced in evidence against the defendant at trial. See Richard M. Re, The Due Process 
Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1912–13 (2014) (explaining that a suspect’s Fourth 
Amendment rights are infringed at the time the police conduct an unconstitutional search and the 
suspect’s due process rights are infringed if the fruits of the unconstitutional search are later relied 
on by a court to impose a conviction); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (explaining 
that a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause does not occur until 
statements compelled by police interrogation are used against a defendant at trial because a 
defendant is not made to be a “witness” against himself in violation of the Clause if his statements 
are never admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case). 
 18. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 608 (2006) (holding that the purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is to “compel respect for the constitutional guaranty . . . by removing the 
incentive to disregard it” (alteration in original) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
217 (1960))); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (“[T]he right to be secure 
against searches and seizures is one of the most difficult to protect. Since the officers are 
themselves the chief invaders, there is no enforcement outside of court.”).  
 19. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to 
the states); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S 383, 398 (1914) (approving the implementation of 
the exclusionary rule in federal trials); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) 
(noting that “the ‘prime purpose’ of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future 
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Because the exclusionary rule has focused on providing law 
enforcement with an incentive to comply with the Constitution, the Court 
has not hesitated to recognize exceptions where the existence of a remedy 
is unlikely to deter unconstitutional conduct.20 In short, the Court has 
tailored the exclusionary rule to provide relief only where necessary to 
deter unconstitutional conduct. To be sure, the exclusionary rule has been 
roundly criticized as ineffective because of these exceptions. But 
empirical evidence suggests that the availability of these remedies at least 
correlates with constitutional compliance by law enforcement officers.  
A.  Incentives for Constitutional Law Enforcement Conduct 
The Supreme Court has recognized that remedies deter law 
enforcement officers from violating the rights of suspects in their 
custody.21 For the past fifty years, the exclusionary rule—which prevents 
the state from introducing evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
statements taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against 
being compelled to be a witness against oneself and the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during interrogation—has been the primary 
means of deterring unconstitutional law enforcement conduct.22  
Justifying a remedy for violations of these constitutional rights 
presented the Court with a dilemma.23 For instance, although defendants 
                                                                                                                     
unlawful police conduct’” (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974))); Stone 
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484–85 (1976) (emphasizing that the judicial integrity policy reasoning 
for the exclusionary rule plays a “limited role . . . in the determination [of] whether to apply the 
rule in a particular context”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (emphasizing 
the exclusionary rule’s purpose to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system).  
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925–26 (1984) (recognizing the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980) 
(recognizing the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule); Jones v. United States, 362 
U.S. 257, 261–64 (1962) (establishing the standing exception to the exclusionary rule). 
 21. See, e.g., Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92; Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional 
Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 281, 286–87 (1988) (observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized 
the shortcomings of traditional tort remedies—and has accordingly embraced deterrent remedies” 
involving the violation of constitutional rights by law enforcement); see also Grant, supra note 
17, at 179–80 (noting that eight members of the Court had accepted the deterrent rationale by 
1949).   
 22. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772 (noting that the Court has “established the Miranda 
exclusionary rule as a prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right protected by the text 
of the Self–Incrimination Clause”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475–76 (1966) (holding 
that the right to counsel during interrogation is a “prerequisite[] to the admissibility of any 
statement made by a defendant”); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule 
to bar evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment). 
 23. See Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal 
Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 638 (1982) (asserting that the rule was originally adopted because 
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have a constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, evidence that law enforcement seizes as a result of 
unconstitutional searches or seizures does not raise concerns of unreliable 
evidence being introduced against defendants. Instead, the 
unconstitutionally seized evidence very likely is perfectly reliable—and 
often compelling—evidence of the defendant’s guilt.24 But as the Court 
recognized in Weeks v. United States25 and Mapp v. Ohio,26 law 
enforcement officers seeking to amass evidence for use in prosecuting 
defendants have strong incentives to ensure that they gather the most 
compelling evidence.27 If illegally seized evidence or illegally obtained 
statements were admissible, law enforcement officers would have every 
incentive to illegally collect that evidence and take those statements.  
Recognizing the importance of ensuring that law enforcement 
officials have at least some incentive to respect the constitutional rights 
of defendants in their custody, the Court created the exclusionary rule to 
remedy constitutional violations, prohibiting the introduction of 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence against criminal defendants at their 
trials.28 Of course, if defendants whose rights were violated had other 
remedies—for instance a robust remedy through a civil action in tort—
then that could provide an incentive for law enforcement to comply with 
                                                                                                                     
“there was no alternative sanction for violations of the [F]ourth [A]mendment that did not cause 
severe underdeterrence,” but arguing from a law and economics perspective that the exclusionary 
rule “imposes a deadweight loss—the suppression of socially valuable evidence” and “produces 
overdeterrence”). 
 24. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 595 (2006) (identifying the cost of the 
exclusionary rule as the “grave adverse consequence that exclusion of relevant incriminating 
evidence always entails (viz., the risk of releasing dangerous criminals into society)”); Pa. Bd. of 
Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (“Because the exclusionary rule precludes 
consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it imposes significant costs: It undeniably detracts 
from the truthfinding process and allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape 
the consequences of their actions.”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (“Each time the 
exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth 
Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for 
truth at trial is deflected.”).  
 25. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. 
 26. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656–57. 
 27. See id. at 656 (noting that officers have an incentive to disregard the constitutional 
guarantee); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392 (acknowledging “[t]he tendency of those who execute the 
criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced 
confessions”). 
 28. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (“[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation 
of the Constitution is, by [the authority of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments], inadmissible 
in a state court.”). In addition to deterring unconstitutional conduct, some scholars have argued 
that the exclusionary rule also prevents courts from admitting and legitimizing illegally seized 
evidence. See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1562 (1972). 
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the Constitution. But no such robust remedy exists.29 As a result, the 
exclusionary rule remedy operates fundamentally, and virtually 
exclusively, to provide law enforcement officers with an incentive to 
respect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. 
B.  Incentive-Based Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule 
Because the Court understood that the exclusionary rule provides 
incentives for constitutional compliance, it has limited the remedy to 
situations most likely to lead to such compliance.30 Exploring a couple of 
these remedial limitations—the good faith exception and the direct result 
limitation—in greater depth further demonstrates the shaping of law 
enforcement incentives as the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
Perhaps the most ubiquitous of the exclusionary rule exceptions, the 
“good faith” exception precludes a remedy if law enforcement officers 
had a good faith belief that they were complying with the Constitution.31 
In United States v. Leon,32 law enforcement officers conducted a search 
pursuant to a warrant obtained from a magistrate.33 The district court and 
court of appeals later concluded that the magistrate had erred in finding 
probable cause and therefore held the warrant invalid.34 Emphasizing the 
exclusionary rule’s focus on incentivizing constitutional behavior, the 
Supreme Court concluded that if the officers executing the warrant had 
no way of knowing that the warrant later would be deemed invalid, 
excluding evidence seized pursuant to the warrant would not in any way 
incentivize constitutional conduct.35 Indeed, only the magistrate’s 
conduct in issuing the warrant could conceivably be “deterred” by 
excluding the evidence seized, since only the magistrate arguably 
engaged in the “wrongful” conduct of issuing a warrant on less than 
probable cause.36 But because there was no evidence either that a 
magistrate judge was intentionally issuing invalid warrants or that the 
exclusionary rule would affect his determinations of probable cause, the 
Court held that the exclusionary rule did not serve a sufficient purpose 
under these circumstances.37 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See infra Section III.B (describing the limitations of the tort remedy provided by 42 
U.S.C. § 1983).  
 30. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 679–86 (2011) (discussing the Court’s retrenchment of 
the exclusionary rule remedy). 
 31. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925–26 (1984). 
 32. Id. at 922–23. 
 33. Id. at 902. 
 34. Id. at 903–05.  
 35. Id. at 919–21. 
 36. Id. at 916. 
 37. Id. at 916–17.  
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In the years since the Court created the good faith exception, the Court 
has significantly expanded it to include not just searches undertaken 
pursuant to a warrant but also warrantless searches.38 For instance, the 
Court has held that the good faith exception covers evidence seized in a 
warrantless search undertaken in reliance on precedent that permitted the 
search at the time but that later was deemed unconstitutional.39 Similarly, 
the Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to warrantless 
searches conducted either pursuant to a subsequently invalidated statute40 
or on the basis of erroneous information about a pending warrant in a 
database.41 The wisdom of the good faith exception has been hotly 
disputed,42 but the reasoning behind it makes sense if the primary purpose 
of the exclusionary rule remedy is incentivizing constitutional 
compliance.  
The Court also has relied on the importance of incentivizing 
constitutional compliance in holding that the exclusionary rule bars 
admission only of evidence that directly resulted from the 
unconstitutional conduct.43 When the constitutional violation did not 
directly procure the evidence, law enforcement officers would be much 
less likely to understand the evidentiary consequences and respond 
accordingly in the future. In New York v. Harris,44 for example, the police 
had probable cause to arrest the defendant, but because they arrested him 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987). 
 41. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
14–16 (1995). 
 42. See Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 934 (1986) (condemning the 
Court’s reasoning in Leon as treating the Fourth Amendment as nothing but an “advisory norm”). 
Despite his harsh criticism of the Leon opinion, however, Professor Donald Dripps believes that 
where the police obtain a warrant, there will almost always be probable cause and that an appellate 
court generally should not second-guess that probable cause determination. Id. at 941–42; see also 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the Court’s claim that 
punishing negligence will not achieve deterrence flouts a most basic premise of tort law); Wayne 
R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the 
Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2009) (criticizing every aspect of 
the Court’s decision to extend the good faith exception to cases where the Fourth Amendment 
violation is the result of “negligence attenuated from the arrest”). 
 43. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) (declining to apply the 
exclusionary rule where the connection between the Fourth Amendment violation and the 
incriminating evidence is sufficiently attenuated). The Court is more likely to find such 
attenuation if the violation led to discovery of a witness rather than an object. Id. at 280; see also 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1979) (listing factors to be considered in the 
attenuation analysis and explaining that where the official misconduct leads more directly to 
evidence, the exclusionary rule should apply both to deter misconduct and to maintain the integrity 
of the courts). 
 44.  495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
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in his house without a warrant, they violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.45 After his arrest, the officers took the defendant to the police 
station where he confessed to the crime.46 The question before the Court 
was whether the conceded Fourth Amendment violation—the warrantless 
arrest of the defendant in his house—should result in the exclusion at trial 
of the station house statement.47  
The Court first held that the police had the defendant in lawful custody 
at the time he made the statement because they had probable cause for his 
arrest, and the Fourth Amendment violation concerned only the 
circumstances of his arrest (in his house rather than on the street).48 
Because his statement did not directly result from unlawful custody, “the 
incremental deterrent value [from excluding evidence] would be 
minimal.”49 The Court contrasted these facts with a situation in which 
officers illegally arrested a defendant in his house and took a statement 
from him in the house.50 Because the statement in that case could be 
directly attributed to the officers’ unconstitutional conduct, exclusion 
would have a more significant deterrent effect and therefore would 
outweigh the cost to the system of suppressing the evidence.51 
There are, of course, other incentive-based exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule,52 and many scholars have argued that the value of the 
exclusionary rule has been so diluted that it provides law enforcement 
with only the most minimal incentive to comply with the Fourth and Fifth 
                                                                                                                     
 45. Id. at 15–16. 
 46. Id. at 16.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 18.  
 49. Id. at 20. 
 50. Id.   
 51. Id. at 20–21.  
 52. For instance, the Court has held that defendants cannot assert claims based on the 
violation of the constitutional rights of others—the so-called “standing” doctrine—grounding this 
exception in the fact that law enforcement officers have little incentive to violate the rights of one 
person to seek evidence against another person. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 
105–06 (1980) (finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in another 
person’s purse and therefore could not challenge the search of that purse); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (changing the nature of the inquiry from “standing” to substantive rights but 
maintaining the same rules); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (holding that a 
defendant cannot challenge the introduction of evidence that resulted from a search or seizure of 
a third party). The “public safety” exception, which renders admissible statements elicited in 
reasonable response to public safety concerns even without prior Miranda warnings, responds to 
the balancing of the deterrent value of exclusion against the societal cost of exclusion. See New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (permitting police to question a suspect without 
Miranda warnings when necessary to protect the public safety and declining to inquire into the 
subjective motivation of the officers).  
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Amendments.53 But even in its diluted form, because the remedial 
limitations focus on the extent to which providing a remedy might affect 
law enforcement conduct, the exclusionary rule has retained its core 
function of providing an incentive to comply with the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendment rights.54 
C.  Evidence of the Incentivizing Effect of the Exclusionary Rule 
The Court’s recognition of the exclusionary rule has been the subject 
of abundant academic discussion over the past fifty years,55 at least some 
of which has criticized both the importance and effectiveness of the 
exclusionary rule as a mechanism to deter unconstitutional conduct.56 But 
empirical evidence suggests that, at least in the context of Miranda v. 
Arizona,57 and likely the Fourth Amendment, the conduct of law 
                                                                                                                     
 53. See L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary 
Rule—A New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil 
Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 755 (1998) 
(explaining that the results of an empirical study show “[t]he exclusionary rule does not even 
apply to most police misconduct, and therefore is simply inadequate as a deterrent”); see also 
David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
7, 10 (2012) (arguing that the many exceptions to the exclusionary rule allowing admission of 
illegally seized evidence in a variety of litigation forums collateral to criminal trials encourage 
state and local police officers to engage in illegal searches and seizures); David A. Harris, How 
Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—or Replace—the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 194 (2009) (noting that “police officers rarely if 
ever suffer personal or professional consequences for disobeying Fourth Amendment rules” and 
that “some substantial number of officers find it easy, or worthwhile in some way, to ignore the 
exclusionary rule for what they perceive as good and sufficient reasons”). 
 54. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (holding that a Fourth 
Amendment violation triggered by police negligence did not justify application of the 
exclusionary rule and reasoning that the exclusionary rule “serves to deter deliberate, reckless or 
grossly negligent conduct”); see also Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 953 (1965) (noting that “[t]he beneficent aim of the 
exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct can be sufficiently accomplished by a 
practice . . . outlawing evidence obtained by flagrant or deliberate violation of rights” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (acknowledging in 
euphemistic language that “[t]he debate within the Court on the exclusionary rule has always been 
a warm one”); Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2001) (“Few debates in American law are as sustained, or as bitter, as the debate over 
the exclusionary rule.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Bloom & Fentin, supra note 17, at 78–80 (advocating reliance on the judicial 
integrity rationale); Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 821, 822 (2013) (asserting that “[a]lthough it is well accepted that the Court 
now treats the exclusionary remedy as exclusively deterrence-driven, the Court has not articulated 
a coherent theory explaining how it expects exclusion to deter unconstitutional searches and why 
it considers deterrence a worthy goal” (footnote omitted)).  
 57. 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (holding that the right to counsel during interrogation is a 
“prerequisite[] to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant”).  
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enforcement officers corresponds to the likelihood that defendants have 
a remedy.58 To be sure, the evidence is not overwhelming.59 But data at 
least suggest that law enforcement officers conform their conduct to the 
likelihood of a remedy. 
In particular, data demonstrate that limiting the exclusionary rule 
remedy results in more deliberate violations.60 Since Miranda, the Court 
has created two exceptions to its exclusionary rule: (1) permitting the 
state to introduce statements taken in violation of Miranda for 
impeachment purposes,61 and (2) permitting law enforcement to use those 
statements during their investigation.62 As Professor Charles Weisselberg 
has documented, as soon as the Court allowed some use of statements 
obtained in violation of Miranda, law enforcement officials began 
training officers in permissible uses of the statements.63  
After the Court’s decisions permitting use of statements taken in 
violation of Miranda, training materials distributed to California law 
enforcement officers contained explicit instructions that questioning 
“outside Miranda”—after defendants have invoked their right to silence 
or asked for counsel—does not violate a defendant’s rights and is 
                                                                                                                     
 58. See Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1442–43 (1987) (describing how the Court’s exclusionary rule jurisprudence 
incentivizes police officers to follow the law where a violation would provide the defendant a 
remedy and to cross the line where no remedy is available); Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free 
to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 524–25 (2002) (discussing the effect of exclusionary 
rule remedies on law enforcement compliance with Miranda); Dellinger, supra note 28, at 1563 
(arguing against the adoption of a tort remedy as a substitute for the exclusionary rule because it 
would permit law enforcement officers to buy their way out of complying with the Constitution); 
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 132 (1998) (documenting the 
sensitivity of police to the remedies provided for a violation of Miranda); see also Donald Dripps, 
The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts Court: Normative and Empirical 
Dimensions of the Over-deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 227–28 (2010) (citing 
a study of Maryland police officers that showed in 48.4% of non-consent searches pursuant to 
traffic stops, the police found contraband). Professor Dripps argues that after discounting small, 
personal amounts of marijuana, the “hit rate” for these searches is actually under ten percent and 
that these numbers indicate that the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for warrantless 
searches, but that the low “hit rate” shows that the exclusionary rule does not currently do enough 
to deter illegal warrantless searches. Id. at 228. 
 59. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2008) (stating that it is not possible to quantify the effect of the 
exclusionary rule on police behavior). 
 60. See Weisselberg, supra note 58, at 134–36. 
 61. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). 
 62. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450–52 (1974) (holding that although the state 
could not introduce against the defendant evidence of a statement law enforcement officers 
obtained in violation of Miranda, the state could use the defendant’s statement to find other 
witnesses against him). 
 63. Weisselberg, supra note 58, at 134–35. 
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permissible to gain information that can be used in any way except 
directly against the defendant at trial.64 As a result, “a substantial number 
of appellate decisions . . . reported deliberate Miranda violations in 
interrogations in counties all around the state.”65 
The data are somewhat mixed regarding whether the exclusionary rule 
effectively deters illegal searches and seizures, but at least some studies 
have concluded that it has had a deterrent effect.66 And this makes sense. 
After all, the suppression remedy requires law enforcement officers to 
weigh the likelihood that the court will suppress the evidence they collect 
against the potential benefit gained by violating the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.67 But without any possibility of suppression, there 
is no incentive to comply with those rights.  
To be sure, many state actors would comply with their constitutional 
responsibilities even without any incentive.68 But in the rough and tumble 
of criminal prosecutions, at least some law enforcement officers believe 
they have an obligation to society to build a strong case against those who 
they believe have done wrong.69 To the extent that the Constitution does 
not provide a remedy for actions they take, it perhaps is understandable 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 136. 
 66. See, e.g., Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress 
and “Lost Cases:” The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1065 (1991) (analyzing data from seven counties and concluding that the 
exclusionary rule “serves as an incentive for many police officers to follow the limits imposed by 
the Fourth Amendment” and that “police were willing to follow guidelines established by the 
Constitution, the district attorney’s office, and the courts when writing search warrant 
applications”). But see James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the 
Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 276–77 (1973) (citing to studies of 
motions to suppress and finding that “[t]he sample is small but it seems to indicate that some 
police, at least, are not deterred by the exclusionary rule at all”).  
 67. See Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 
1001 (2012) (contending that the Court’s exceptions to excluding evidence obtained in violation 
of Miranda incentivize police misconduct). Professor Yale Kamisar points out that even if 
individual police officers do not engage in this sort of economic analysis, the authors of their 
training manuals will. Id.  
 68. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes’ Path of the Law One Hundred 
Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353, 374–75 (1997) (acknowledging that prosecutors usually obey 
a constitutional ruling even if they could generally violate it without any extrinsic consequences). 
 69. Cf. Kinports, supra note 56, at 833–34 (discussing “organizational theory” and how it 
posits that police officers have developed their own cultural norms that may result in widespread 
wrongdoing without any individual officer thinking he is doing anything wrong). In an editorial 
imploring citizens to provide information about a murder, columnist Mary Mitchell wrote that 
police officers sometimes justify violating citizens’ rights when looking for a dangerous 
perpetrator because witnesses will not “snitch,” and therefore police feel obligated to do whatever 
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that they believe their conduct justified.70 Thus, for better or worse, the 
availability of a suppression remedy has had an impact on the conduct of 
law enforcement.71  
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF DETERRING INVISIBLE VIOLATIONS OF HIGH-
COST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
In contrast to the exclusionary rule remedial scheme, the Court in 
devising a remedial scheme for trial-level violations of constitutional 
rights has never considered the importance of providing incentives for 
constitutional conduct by state actors.72 For this category of constitutional 
error—occurring after the trial court has appointed counsel and taken 
oversight of the case—the Court essentially has entrusted defense counsel 
and trial courts with the responsibility of protecting the constitutional 
rights of criminal defendants.73 This may be because trial courts that have 
the authority and obligation to respond to objections by the defendant can 
generally correct errors that occur before the trial court—for instance, 
violations of the defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses or 
to not testify—relatively easily. And to the extent that defense counsel 
can anticipate and raise a potential constitutional error, trial courts can act 
to prevent that error.  
Because the Court appears to assume that trial courts will correct these 
errors, it has limited post-violation appellate remedies to situations where 
constitutional violations deprive defendants of fundamentally fair trials.74 
                                                                                                                     
 70. See Weisselberg, supra note 58, at 153 (noting that exceptions to the exclusionary rule 
for Miranda violations have taught police officers that they should only follow the law when 
necessary to avoid suppression of evidence). 
 71. See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 114 
(2003) (stating that other than the exclusionary rule, there are almost no incentives for police to 
follow the law); David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and 
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1245 (2005) (arguing that exceptions to the 
availability of remedies for criminal defendants causes “prosecutors and police to tailor their 
actions to the sub-constitutional level”).  
 72. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1981) (reviewing precedent on 
Sixth Amendment violations and concluding that “[the Court’s] approach has thus been to identify 
and then neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the 
defendant the effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial”). 
 73. Id. at 365 (reasoning that absent “some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of 
counsel’s representation or . . . other prejudice to the defense. . . . there is no basis for imposing a 
remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendant’s right to 
counsel and to a fair trial”).   
 74. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“In giving meaning to 
the [constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel] . . . we must take its purpose—
to ensure a fair trial—as the guide.”); see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986) 
(recognizing that some constitutional errors require reversal because these errors “necessarily 
render a trial fundamentally unfair. . . . [and w]ithout these basic protections, a criminal trial 
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To be sure, trial courts do provide at least some incentive for state actors 
to respect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.75 After all, the 
threat of the trial court imposing a costly remedy provides an incentive 
for compliance with most constitutional rights. Many constitutional 
errors that occur within a trial court’s jurisdiction therefore are readily 
correctable by those courts. 
But there is a particular category of constitutional rights for which 
remedies before the trial court are wholly inadequate to incentivize 
constitutional compliance.76 State actors often have incentives—both 
economic and non-economic—to err on the side of violating the 
Constitution if there is no consequence to that violation. If ensuring 
robust respect for those constitutional rights imposes significant costs, 
states and local jurisdictions face a substantial disincentive to respect 
those rights. And if trial courts cannot easily detect those constitutional 
violations, states have little external incentive to comply with the 
Constitution. For this particular category of rights—violations of which 
are shrouded from the trial court and counsel and compliance with which 
is costly—states have virtually no incentive, outside of their own moral 
compass and the ethical rules, to protect these rights.77 Two rights—(1) 
Strickland v. Washington’s right to the effective assistance of counsel,78 
and (2) Batson v. Kentucky’s right to a fair and impartial jury79—provide 
                                                                                                                     
cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence”); Morrison, 
449 U.S. at 365 (reasoning that absent “some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel’s 
representation or . . . other prejudice to the defense. . . , there is no basis for imposing a remedy 
in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendant’s right to counsel 
and to a fair trial”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (finding a constitutional violation 
because the state court’s actions “amount[ed] to a denial of effective and substantial aid [of 
counsel]”); United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that in cases involving 
the alleged denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the court “must ‘identify and then 
neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the 
effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial’ [and that] [d]ismissal of an indictment is a remedy 
of last resort”); Gregory Mitchell, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism: Constraining 
Harmless Error Review, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1994) (discussing the automatic reversal 
standard when an error alters the structure of a trial so much that a reliable verdict could not be 
attained). 
 75. See supra note 5. 
 76. The lack of any incentive for constitutional compliance does not mean that every 
jurisdiction systematically violates the rights of criminal defendants. It does, however, mean that 
some jurisdictions systematically violate certain rights with no fear of repercussions. 
 77. By “systematic” violations, this Article refers to constitutional errors that occur 
regularly and frequently in a particular jurisdiction. 
 78. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984).  
 79. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84, 96–98 (1986) (reaffirming that purposeful 
exclusion of jurors based on race violates the Equal Protection Clause and establishing a burden-
shifting framework for determining when a violation occurs).   
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illustrative examples of invisible constitutional error and the importance 
of providing appellate remedies for violations of those rights.  
A.  Invisible Denials of High-Cost Constitutional Rights 
Although trial courts can correct many constitutional errors that occur 
within their jurisdiction, certain errors are far more difficult to detect and 
remedy at the trial level. This occurs either because defense counsel 
cannot (or will not) identify the error or because the error lies primarily 
within the knowledge of the prosecutor.80 If those invisible errors also 
provide significant benefit to the state, the risk of systemic violations of 
those constitutional rights increases substantially. 
Violation of Strickland’s right to effective assistance of counsel is the 
paradigmatic example of an error not usually raised before trial courts. 
Lawyers for defendants raise most errors on behalf of their clients.81 But 
trial lawyers are unlikely to recognize or raise their own ineffectiveness, 
particularly when their clients are pleading guilty.82 And unless a 
defendant knows to raise the lack of diligence or investigation by counsel, 
trial courts often are unaware that there is a problem. Thus, appellate (or 
post-conviction) counsel raise most claims that trial counsel provided 
constitutionally deficient assistance in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.83 As a result, courts usually consider ineffective assistance 
claims only on appeal, if at all.  
Batson errors similarly may be hidden. To establish that a prosecutor 
violated Batson by striking a potential juror on prohibited race or gender 
grounds, defendants must show intentional discrimination by the 
prosecutor; that is, that the prosecutor struck the juror because of her race 
                                                                                                                     
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678–81 (1985) (discussing different 
forms of prosecutorial misconduct).  
 81. James A. Morrow & Joshua R. Larson, Without a Doubt, A Sharp and Radical 
Departure: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision to Change Plain Error Review of 
Unobjected-to Prosecutorial Error in State v. Ramey, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 351, 353 (2008) 
(“[D]efense attorneys are obligated to object to prosecutorial error when it occurs and seek 
corrective action by the trial court.”). 
 82. There are instances of court-appointed counsel asserting that they cannot be effective 
because of their caseloads, but those cases are relatively rare. See, e.g., Pub. Def., Eleventh Jud. 
Cir. of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. 2013). 
 83. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857, 915 (1999) (pointing out that defendants tend to raise ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims only on collateral review because the defendant typically retains his trial lawyer on direct 
appeal). In some states, defendants cannot bring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
direct appeal and can only raise them in collateral proceedings. See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 
S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012) (holding that procedural default does not prevent collateral review of an 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in Arizona because a defendant could bring such a 
claim only on collateral review when the defendant did not have right to counsel).  
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or gender.84 Of course, prosecutors likely possess evidence regarding 
why they struck particular jurors and whether they intended to exclude 
jurors from a defendant’s jury on prohibited grounds. But other than the 
facts in the particular case—that the prosecutor struck most of the people 
of color or women from the jury—defendants often have little evidence 
that a particular prosecutor has engaged in intentional discrimination.85 
Each of these constitutional rights, moreover, carries an elevated risk 
of systemic violations. This is so either because of the high cost of 
complying with these rights or because of entrenched views on the 
benefits of not complying with defendants’ rights.86 Of course, almost 
every constitutional right imposes at least some cost on the state insofar 
as it reduces the likelihood of a conviction.87 But the cost—either 
financial or in terms of workload—of respecting some constitutional 
rights is higher than for others.  
Strickland’s ineffective assistance of counsel standard lends itself to 
systematic violations primarily because ensuring effective assistance of 
counsel for every criminal defendant has significant monetary costs for 
the state.88 The state (or local jurisdiction, depending on what entity 
provides counsel for indigent defendants) has a strong financial incentive 
to minimize the costs of indigent defense providers (usually public 
defender offices).89 As a result, many jurisdictions chronically and 
                                                                                                                     
 84. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98 (describing the three-step burden-shifting process to 
determine whether the prosecution engaged in “purposeful discrimination”). 
 85. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (noting that there will likely not 
be much evidence bearing on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination and that “the best 
evidence often will be the demeanor of the [prosecutor]”); Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable 
Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 
322 (2007) (“Batson challenges occur in a virtual evidentiary vacuum . . . .”).  
 86. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346 
(2003). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that 
advising the defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination before he enters a guilty plea 
ensures that the defendant has knowingly waived this constitutional right that “reduce[s] the 
likelihood of conviction”). 
 88. See John P. Gross, The True Benefits of Counsel: Why “Do-it-Yourself” Lawyering 
Does Not Protect the Rights of the Indigent, 43 N.M. L. REV. 1, 31 n.129 (2013) (citing cases 
where the Supreme Court has recognized the financial burden that the right to counsel places on 
the states); Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United 
States, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32, 43–47 (1995) (recognizing that “[c]ost is usually the 
primary factor determining what type of indigent defense system a state or county adopts” and 
providing examples of state funding methods).  
 89. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante 
Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 252 (“Legislatures, responding to voters 
fearful of crime, have no incentive to devote scarce resources to the defense function rather than 
to additional police or prison space.”); see also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon’s 
Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2003) (arguing that the Gideon Court’s failure to 
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seriously underfund their indigent defense systems.90 Public defenders in 
some jurisdictions carry such enormous caseloads that they cannot 
possibly provide every defendant, in the words of the Strickland Court, 
the “assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”91 
Indigent defense counsel carrying caseloads of 1000–1600 cases per year 
cannot possibly provide effective assistance.92  
Respecting Batson also involves costs for prosecutors, at least in 
jurisdictions in which prosecutors believe that jurors of color will be less 
likely to convict.93 Before Batson, at least some jurisdictions had explicit 
policies and training to ensure that prosecutors did not seat jurors of color, 
                                                                                                                     
provide states with clear guidance on how to develop and fund a system of effective indigent 
representation has contributed to the common practice of “jurisdictions tolerating and even 
fostering minimal levels of performance”). See generally STEPHEN D. OWENS ET AL., BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 246683, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN THE UNITED 
STATES, FY 2008–2012 – UPDATED 1 (2014) (describing the various funding methods states use 
to provide indigent defense and reporting the budget of each state through 2012).  
 90. E.g., Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise by Viewing Excessive 
Caseloads as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 421 (2011) 
(“Excessive caseloads due to the underfunding of public defenders have been the status quo for 
decades . . . .”); Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida: Separation of Powers 
as a Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform, 75 MO. L. REV. 885, 885–87 (2010) (stating that 
“public indigent defense systems nationwide operate in perpetual crisis mode” and describing the 
system of chronic underfunding in Florida). 
 91. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 706 (1984); accord Mary Sue Backus & Paul 
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 
1054–57 (2006) (detailing the problem of crushing caseloads for indigent defense counsel); see 
also Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
461, 470–71 (2007) (providing data on caseloads of public defenders); Richard Klein, The 
Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 391–92 (1993) (identifying problems caused by excessive caseloads); 
Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal 
Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 908 (2004) (identifying excessive caseloads as one of the problems 
confronting indigent defense systems in this country); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond 
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1240–
41 (1993) (noting that “staggering caseloads” lead to “burnout” among public defenders); Taylor-
Thompson, supra note 89, at 1509 (recognizing that caseload caps are critical to quality 
representation). 
 92. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 17 (2004), 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf [hereinafter 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE] (“Caseloads are radically out of whack in some places in New York. 
There are caseloads per year in which a lawyer handles 1,000, 1,200, 1,600 cases.” (quoting 
Jonathan Gradess, Executive Director, New York State Defenders Association)). 
 93. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 263–65 (2005) (condemning a Dallas County 
District Attorney manual on how to systematically exclude African-Americans from juries that 
remained in circulation until at least 1976). 
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particularly in death penalty cases.94 In those jurisdictions, prosecutors 
were trained that jurors of color would side with the defendant and would 
not view the evidence fairly.95 A prosecutor trained that jurors of color 
could not fairly hear the evidence, of course, would have an enormous 
temptation to ensure that no jurors of color sat on the jury. 
For this category of error, trial-level remedies do not incentivize 
constitutional compliance, and a robust appellate remedy is needed to 
incentivize constitutional compliance. But, as discussed below, because 
the Court has only considered the importance of deterring constitutional 
violation in the context of the exclusionary rule, it has limited appellate 
remedies such that they do not provide an adequate means for deterring 
this category of constitutional error. 
B.  Limitations on Appellate Remedies of Constitutional Error 
Because the Court has never considered the importance of deterring 
constitutional error in criminal cases outside of the exclusionary rule, it 
has never contemplated the importance of appellate remedies for ensuring 
compliance with constitutional rights. Instead, when considering 
constitutional violations that occur after the start of trial proceedings and 
the appointment of counsel, the Court’s remedial scheme has focused 
solely on the fairness of the proceedings.96 It therefore has limited 
appellate remedies—through the harmless error rule and the Strickland 
prejudice standard among others—to constitutional errors affecting the 
outcome of proceedings with no consideration of incentives for 
constitutional compliance.  
Beginning with harmless error, in Chapman v. California,97 the Court 
held that most claims of constitutional error can be remedied on appeal 
only if there is a reasonable possibility that the constitutional violation 
might have contributed to the outcome.98 Or, to phrase it slightly 
                                                                                                                     
 94. See id. at 264 (noting the District Attorney Office’s “formal policy to exclude minorities 
from jury service”).   
 95. See Ronald J. Tabak, The Continuing Role of Race in Capital Cases, Notwithstanding 
President Obama’s Election, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 267–68 (2010) (discussing the Dallas District 
Attorney Office policy at issue in Miller-El and an instructional video used by a District Attorney 
in Philadelphia to train prosecutors on how to evade Batson); Former Philadelphia Prosecutor 
Accused of Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1997, at A14, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/03/ 
us/former-philadelphia-prosecutor-accused-of-racial-bias.html (quoting the Philadelphia District 
Attorney training video that instructed that “blacks from the low-income areas are less likely to 
convict” because of “a resentment for law enforcement”).  
 96. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
 97. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  
 98. Id. at 24; see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the 
Institutional Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2035–37 (describing the history 
of the constitutional harmless error rule). If a defendant fails to object in the trial court to a 
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differently, a court will not deem constitutional errors harmless unless the 
state establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the verdict.99 At first blush, it appears unlikely that a court 
would ever find constitutional errors harmless. After all, requiring proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict 
sets a high bar for a finding of harmless error.100  
In operation, however, the harmless error doctrine blocks a significant 
number of claims of constitutional error. Indeed, one study that examined 
cases of criminal defendants who later were exonerated found that 
appellate courts in sixteen percent of those cases had previously found 
constitutional error but concluded that the error was harmless.101 The 
prevalence of court findings of harmless error arises from the fact that the 
standard increasingly has moved toward assessing the strength of other 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt, rather than evaluating the magnitude of 
the constitutional error.102 Thus, regardless how egregious the violation 
of the defendant’s constitutional rights, as long as the state has strong 
evidence of guilt, a court will deem the error harmless.103 
                                                                                                                     
constitutional error, appellate review is even more limited. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 732 (1993) (limiting review of errors that were not objected to during trial to those that 
“seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” (quoting 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985))).  
 99. Of course, states may require reversal of constitutional error even if harmless, but most 
jurisdictions adhere to some form of the harmless error rule. See Dennis J. Braithwaite, Coerced 
Confessions, Harmless Error: The “Guilty as Hell” Rule in State Courts, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
233, 236 & n.23 (2012) (concluding that most state courts follow the Supreme Court’s harmless 
error rule with regard to coerced confessions); Dick R. Schlegel, The Evolution of Harmless Error 
in Iowa: Where Do We Go from Here?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 547, 549 (1995) (noting that state 
courts, particularly Iowa, follow Chapman’s harmless error rule). 
 100. The standard for obtaining reversal for non-constitutional error presents a much higher 
burden for criminal defendants. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946) 
(reiterating that in the context of a non-constitutional violation, the burden is on “the party seeking 
a new trial [to show] that any technical errors that he may complain of have affected his substantial 
rights” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 913, 65th Cong. 3d Sess., at 1 (1919))). 
 101. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 108 tbl.8 (2008). 
 102. See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal 
Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1995) (“The problem with harmless error 
arises when we as appellate judges conflate the harmlessness inquiry with our own assessment of 
a defendant’s guilt. This approach is dangerously seductive, for our natural inclination is to view 
an error as harmless whenever a defendant’s conviction appears well justified by the record 
evidence. However, the seductiveness of this approach is its chief defect, for, drawn in by its 
attractions, we have applied the harmless-error rule to such an extent that it is my impression that 
my colleagues and I are inclined to invoke it almost automatically where the proof of a defendant’s 
guilt seems strong.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful 
Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 58–60 (criticizing the Court for assuming the error was 
harmless whenever there is other strong evidence of guilt and arguing that the Court has 
effectively placed the burden on the defendant to prove that the error was harmless).  
 103. See Edwards, supra note 102.  
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The harmless error standard does not apply to constitutional errors “so 
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless 
error.”104 But this category of “structural error”—an error that “affect[s] 
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error 
in the trial process itself”105—is narrow, encompassing only 
constitutional violations that both strike at the core of the most 
fundamental constitutional rights and defy harmless error analysis.106 
Structural errors include Batson violations,107 as well as actual or 
constructive denials of counsel, denials of the right to a public trial or the 
right to proceed pro se, and denial of the right to an unbiased judge or 
jury.108 Violations of precious few other rights have been deemed 
structural errors.109  
The harmless error doctrine has been the subject of intense criticism 
because of the extent to which it curtails the availability of an appellate 
remedy for constitutional violations.110 But the Court’s instinct that not 
every constitutional violation should result in reversal is 
understandable.111 After all, in the absence of a requirement that the 
constitutional error in some way affected the result of the proceeding, 
even the most trivial of errors would result in reversal.112 And although 
some scholars contend that constitutional errors cannot be trivial,113 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). 
 105. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). 
 106. See id. at 290–91 (listing the limited categories of structural error and criticizing the 
majority for construing structural error so narrowly).  
 107. See Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 160–61 (2009). 
 108. See Fairfax, supra note 98, at 2038.  
 109. See, e.g., Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307–09 (holding that the introduction of a coerced 
confession is trial error rather than a structural error and therefore subject to harmless error 
analysis); see also Fairfax, supra note 98, at 2038–39 (analyzing Fulminante). 
 110. See Edwards, supra note 102, at 1169–70; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. 
Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
152, 172 (1991) (observing that “even the accused have rights and that only automatic reversal 
can fully vindicate such rights”). 
 111. See ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 3–4 (1970) (describing how 
courts used to reverse convictions for the most trivial of errors). For example, Judge Roger 
Traynor discusses a case where the appellate court reversed because the indictment charged the 
defendant with “larcey” instead of “larceny.” TRAYNOR, supra (discussing People v. St. Clair, 56 
Cal. 406 (1880)); cf. Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1, 20 (2002) (noting that although the precise content of the harmless error doctrine has been 
subject to dispute, “there is near unanimity in support of harmless error as a concept”).  
 112. See Fairfax, supra note 98, at 2035 (noting that before Chapman, virtually every 
constitutional error resulted in reversal of a conviction). 
 113. See Linda E. Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A Doctrine 
Misunderstood and Misapplied, 28 GA. L. REV. 125, 126, 164–66 (1993) (arguing that harmless 
error doctrine should not apply to constitutional errors in the penalty phase of a capital case); Tom 
Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 91–92 
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requiring a new trial where the constitutional violation was neither 
particularly egregious nor particularly harmful to the defendant likely 
would not lead to a different outcome for the defendant. 
Like the harmless error doctrine, Strickland’s prejudice standard 
examines the fairness of the proceeding and the reliability of the outcome 
in assessing the availability of a remedy. Under the familiar standard 
established in Strickland, a defendant must establish (1) that counsel’s 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) 
a reasonable probability that the errors of counsel led to the outcome.114 
As with harmless error, the Court has explained the requirement that the 
defendant show prejudice almost entirely with reference to the goal of 
ensuring trials that give rise to reliable outcomes: “The purpose of the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has 
the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the 
proceeding.”115 And as with harmless error, the Court increasingly has 
moved to assessing the strength of the government’s evidence against the 
defendant in determining materiality.116  
Those similarities aside, Strickland’s prejudice standard presents a 
significantly higher bar to relief than the harmless error standard for two 
reasons. First, the defendant has the burden of proving prejudice, whereas 
the state has the burden of establishing harmless error.117 Second, 
prejudice requires that the defendant establish a reasonable probability of 
a different result.118 Because the Court has held that courts may consider 
the prejudice prong even before finding deficient performance,119 
Strickland’s prejudice requirement has come to dominate the law of 
ineffective assistance, with courts disposing of the vast majority of 
ineffective assistance claims on prejudice grounds.120 
                                                                                                                     
(1988) (proposing that reversal should be required whenever the error impairs the purpose of the 
relevant constitutional right or when reversal is needed for deterrence). 
 114. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984). 
 115. Id. at 691–92. 
 116. See Braithwaite, supra note 99, at 243–44 (noting that many state courts now determine 
whether an error was harmless by asking “whether, once erroneously admitted evidence is 
excluded, there remains overwhelming evidence to support the jury’s verdict” (quoting Martha 
A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error—A Process in Need of a 
Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15, 16 (1976))).  
 117. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).   
 118. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
 119. See id. at 697. 
 120. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 
427 (1996) (stating that defendants usually have to show prejudice even if counsel was drunk, 
asleep, or under the influence of drugs); see also Bruce A. Green & Daniel Richman, Of Laws 
and Men: An Essay on Justice Marshall’s View of Criminal Procedure, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 
396–97 (1994) (noting that the Strickland framework makes it likely that the issue of counsel’s 
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One other arguable difference between harmless error and 
Strickland’s prejudice standard deserves mention: the right–remedy 
distinction. The Court has been quite clear that the harmless error 
standard, which applies across a number of constitutional doctrines, 
concerns only the availability of a remedy for constitutional violations.121 
In other words, whether the state violated the defendant’s constitutional 
rights is distinct whether the error was harmless.122 
It is much less clear, however, whether prejudice defines (1) the scope 
of the right to effective assistance, (2) the parameters of a Strickland 
violation, or (3) the existence of a remedy for violation of the right. In 
Strickland itself, the Court held only that a claim of ineffective assistance 
requires a showing of prejudice on appeal. Indeed, as the Court put it: 
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was 
so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death 
sentence has two components. First, the defendant must 
show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable.123 
Because the first prong of the Strickland inquiry focuses on whether 
counsel was acting as the “counsel” required by the Sixth Amendment,124 
that prong of the analysis appears to focus entirely on whether the 
                                                                                                                     
performance does not even arise in most cases); Right to Counsel, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. 
PROC. 497–99, n.1560 (2008) (compiling cases on ineffective assistance of counsel); Martin C. 
Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward A Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L. J. 413, 455 (1988) (noting that courts rejected 
43.3% of all unsuccessful ineffective assistance of counsel claims studied solely for lack of 
prejudice). 
 121. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21–24, 49  (applying for the first time harmless 
error analysis to constitutional violations); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) 
(reminding courts that apart from a very limited class, those that affect “substantial rights,” 
constitutional errors must be disregarded if they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Rose 
v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578–79 (1986) (stating that almost all errors must go through harmless 
error analysis).  
 122. The Court has made clear that courts can assess the issue of harm before deciding whether 
there in fact was constitutional error, but the two inquiries remain separate. See Edwards, supra note 
102, at 1182 (noting that sometimes courts openly decline to decide whether a defendant’s rights 
have been violated by determining that any arguable violation is harmless). 
 123. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. 
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defendant received the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. After all, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel. The only question, then, would 
be whether the deprivation of that right entitles the defendant to a remedy, 
i.e., whether the deficient performance of counsel prejudiced the 
defendant.  
To be sure, the Court in Strickland defined violation of the right to 
counsel in terms of prejudice: “[A]ny deficiencies in counsel’s 
performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute 
ineffective assistance under the Constitution.”125 But it appears 
nonsensical to assert that a defendant who has established deficient 
performance—that counsel “made errors so serious” counsel did not 
provide the assistance required by the Sixth Amendment—has not 
established a violation of that right.126 In any event, regardless whether 
the state’s disregard of the right to counsel constitutes a violation of the 
defendant’s right without a remedy or is instead a deprivation of a 
constitutional right that does not rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation, the parameters of defendants’ constitutional rights in this 
context appear clear. 
C.  The Importance of Remedies for Deterring Invisible, Cost-Effective 
Constitutional Error 
The Court’s failure to consider the importance of incentivizing 
constitutional compliance outside of the exclusionary rule context has 
led, in certain jurisdictions, to patterns of intentional, invisible 
constitutional error—particularly the failure to provide effective 
assistance of counsel.127 The traditional framework fails to assure that the 
system operates within constitutional constraints because these errors 
cannot be corrected at the trial level and instead require a showing on 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Id. at 692.  
 126. See Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1–2, 11 (recognizing that defendants 
presumably have a right to effective assistance of counsel but that the toothless Strickland test 
dilutes that right); see also Joan Stumpf, Case Note, Criminal Law—A New Standard for 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims—Commonwealth v. Pierce, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 515, 521, 
537–38 (1988) (recognizing the right to effective assistance of counsel but criticizing the 
Strickland prejudice prong as subordinating it to the right to a fair trial). But see Sanjay K. 
Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 
35–36 (2009) (stating that Strickland currently requires prejudice as an element of a Sixth 
Amendment violation but that the Court has recently shown willingness to separate the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel from the Due Process-based prejudice 
showing). 
 127. See Anderson, supra note 90, at 421–22 (noting that Florida and Colorado have passed 
laws that “effectively legislate around the Sixth Amendment”). 
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appeal or habeas of a violation of the defendant’s fair trial rights. For 
these errors, then, the system incentivizes hiding errors.  
Before examining instances of systematic Strickland violations, 
however, this Section reviews the operation of Batson’s remedies to 
demonstrate that remedies for widespread constitutional violations deter 
blatantly deliberate violations of constitutional rights. Prior to Batson, 
some jurisdictions could (and did) train prosecutors to strike jurors solely 
on the basis of race with no repercussion.128 Batson, of course, both held 
unconstitutional juror strikes motivated by race and, importantly, also 
held that such strikes constitute “structural error” that does not require 
the defendant to show harmless error.129 In addition, because the Court 
has determined that evidence that a prosecutor’s office consistently 
engaged in discriminatory conduct can help establish its discriminatory 
motive,130 prosecutors’ offices now have reason to fear that courts will 
overturn convictions, regardless of the strength of the evidence against 
the defendant, if the office (1) has a policy (formal or informal) endorsing 
the violation of this right, or (2) engages in a pattern of striking jurors of 
color.131  
As a result, prosecutors now have an incentive to avoid systematically 
and blatantly violating Batson. Of course, this does not mean that Batson 
is respected in every case.132 Instead, it means that prosecutors’ offices 
can no longer have policies of training their lawyers to violate Batson, 
and they also have good cause to worry about establishing patterns of 
striking jurors of color absent good reasons. Allegations of Batson 
violations still occur,133 but allegations of more recent Batson violations 
appear to involve allegations of more nuanced violations.134 To put it 
another way, the Batson remedy prevents the most blatant violations.  
                                                                                                                     
 128. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (discussing the pre-Batson circulation of 
both a manual that advocated for the systematic exclusion of African Americans at the Dallas 
County District Attorney’s Office and a comparable instructional video in Philadelphia). 
 129. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986); see also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 
148, 153, 160–61 (2009) (noting that Batson errors are structural and not subject to harmless error 
review).  
 130. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 253 (2005);  Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 
322, 346–47 (2003). 
 131. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.  
 132. Professor Albert Alschuler describes the indisputable impact of Batson on prosecutors’ 
offices despite its numerous “loopholes.” See Alschuler, supra note 68, at 374–75. 
 133. See id. at 374. 
 134. See, e.g., Green v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d 1028, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a Batson 
violation where the prosecutor noted the race of each venire member he struck from the jury pool); 
Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1078–80 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination when the prosecutor struck two African Americans and four Hispanics because the 
strikes could be analyzed together to raise an inference of discrimination). But see Bond v. Beard, 
539 F.3d 256, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a video instructing prosecutors on how to take 
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Batson’s deterrence of at least the most blatant violations contrasts 
with the lack of any incentive to comply with Strickland.135 After all, 
states can hide ineffectiveness of defense counsel with the assurance that 
a court is extremely unlikely to overturn a conviction. As a result, at least 
a few jurisdictions have tailored constitutional compliance to the 
likelihood that a court will reverse the conviction on appeal, rather than 
respecting the constitutional rights of defendants.136 The incentive 
structure for states raises virtually no chance that a court will reverse a 
conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel. This is because there is 
only a minimal chance that a defendant will actually raise ineffective 
assistance on appeal, and, if the claim is raised, it is extremely unlikely 
that a court will find counsel’s errors prejudicial.137 The probability of 
both of these events happening is exceedingly minimal.138 This is so for 
                                                                                                                     
race into account but circumvent Batson did not show a pattern of discrimination because the 
general office policy was to comply with Batson); United States v. Moreno, 217 F.3d 592, 594 
(8th Cir. 2000) (finding no Batson violation where the defendant was Mexican American and the 
prosecutor struck the only Mexican American from the jury because another Hispanic American 
did serve on the jury and the prosecutor gave a race-neutral reason); McCain v. Gramley, 96 F.3d 
288, 292–94 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding no Batson violation when the prosecutor struck a higher 
percentage of African Americans than the percentage of African Americans in the venire because 
this amounted to only two African Americans, and the prosecutor gave race-neutral reasons).  
 135. Defendants’ right under Brady to disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the hands of 
prosecutors provides another example of invisible constitutional error. Prosecutors have every 
incentive to hide exculpatory material from defendants at trial, and Brady’s materiality standard 
precludes most defendants from obtaining a reversal. The New Orleans District Attorneys’ Office 
under former-District Attorney Harry Connick provides perhaps the clearest example. See Adam 
Liptak, $14 Million Jury Award to Ex-Inmate Is Dismissed, NY TIMES (Mar. 29, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/us/30scotus.html.  
 136. See Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Envisioning Post-Conviction Review for the 
Twenty-First Century, 78 MISS. L.J. 433, 438 (2008) (noting that post-conviction litigation focuses 
on mistakes of counsel rather than the merit of constitutional claims).  
 137. This Article recognizes it is unlikely that local or state legislatures’ actions are this 
deliberate. If, however, local legislatures believed that convictions would be overturned because 
they were not adequately funding indigent defenders, funding undoubtedly would increase. 
 138. There are no existing statistics on the possibility of a felony conviction leading to a 
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but the existing data strongly suggest that the 
chance of a felony case being reversed on appeal ranges from slim to none. In 2008, for instance, 
there were a total of thirty-five published federal court decisions (either at the district court or 
appellate level) finding ineffective assistance of counsel either on direct appeal or on habeas 
motions. See TERESA L. NORRIS, SUMMARIES OF PUBLISHED SUCCESSFUL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL CLAIMS POST-WIGGINS V. SMITH (2013), https://www.capdefnet.org/hat/uploadedFile 
s/Public/Helpful_Cases/Ineffective_Assistance_of_Counsel/IAC%20PostWiggins%2072613.pdf 
(compiling and summarizing successful, published ineffective assistance of counsel cases). In that 
same year, there were 76,572 felony convictions in federal court alone. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 231822, 2008- STATISTICAL TABLES 
tbl.4.2., http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2008/tables/fjs08st402.pdf. Suffice it to say 
that successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims are rare. 
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a couple of reasons. First, most defendants plead guilty,139 and many 
either waive their right to appeal or have no basis for an appeal after their 
pleas.140 Second, the chance that a defendant can establish prejudice on 
appeal constitutes an almost nonexistent threat.141 States therefore have 
little cause for concern that defendants’ convictions will be overturned 
for ineffective assistance.  
Infringements of the constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel, moreover, are widespread because of the very real financial 
pressures states face. Unlike the vast majority of constitutional rights 
guaranteed to criminal defendants, the right to counsel requires 
significant expenditures by the state (and in many jurisdictions also the 
county or the city).142 Good lawyers often cost more than bad lawyers, if 
for no other reason than that they actually spend the necessary time on 
each case.143 States, of course, have every incentive to provide the 
cheapest representation they can find, regardless of the quality. This is 
particularly true given that criminal defendants have at most little (and 
                                                                                                                     
 139. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 215646, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 
2004 at 1 (2007),  http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf (indicating that ninety-five 
percent of felony convictions in state courts were the result of a guilty plea in 2004). 
 140. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011) (“[B]ecause most guilty pleas waive 
defendants’ rights to appeal, few typical guilty-plea cases ever reach[ ] the Supreme Court.”); 
Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, 
Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2087–95 (2000) (noting that courts 
usually uphold plea bargain waivers of the right to appeal); J. Peter Veloski, Comment, Bargain 
for Justice or Face the Prison of Privileges? The Ethical Dilemma in Plea Bargain Waivers of 
Collateral Relief, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 429, 430 (2014) (noting that it is common for defendants to 
waive their rights to appeal in plea bargains, even before they know what sentence they will 
receive). 
 141. Establishing prejudice from counsel’s conduct during a guilty plea is even more 
complicated than in a post-trial situation because the defendant must establish that the defendant 
would not have pleaded guilty absent counsel’s errors. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, 
Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 
697, 737–39 (2002) (noting that even if defense counsel were required to inform clients about the 
collateral consequences of guilty pleas under the performance prong, it would be difficult for the 
defendant to establish he would not have taken the plea anyway). 
 142. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1866–70, 1883 (1994) (arguing that the 
inadequacy of counsel for the poor is partially due to most state governments’ unwillingness to 
pay for it); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 89, at 1480 (criticizing the Gideon Court for failing to 
acknowledge the enormous financial burden it placed on the states and, thus, failing to make clear 
that the Court expected “more than a cosmetic adherence to its ruling”). 
 143. This Article recognizes that this often is not true. Indeed, experienced public defenders 
often prove more cost-effective than other lawyers. But experienced and responsible lawyers will 
not accept the caseloads required in some jurisdictions because they recognize that they cannot 
responsibly do so.  
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very likely no) voice or power in the matter because states set their own 
budgets.  
As a result, in many jurisdictions across the country, legislators expect 
public defenders to manage caseloads so excessive that they cannot 
possibly provide constitutionally adequate representation to all of their 
clients. This problem has been exhaustively and comprehensively 
documented in many reports and articles.144 The American Bar 
Association and many advocates have worked to enact caseload standards 
that would limit criminal defense lawyers to handling 150 felony cases 
per year or 400 misdemeanor cases.145 In light of those standards, one 
example suffices to demonstrate the excessive caseload point. In 
testimony before the ABA given in 2004, the Executive Director of the 
New York State Defenders Association said: “Caseloads are radically out 
of whack in some places in New York. There are caseloads per year in 
which a lawyer handles 1,000, 1,200, 1,600 cases.”146 A lawyer working 
eight hours per day every weekday with no vacation for fifty-two weeks 
has 2080 hours of work time per year. That lawyer would have just over 
an hour to devote to each of her 1600 clients, assuming she spent her 
business day working directly on those clients’ cases rather than on any 
administrative tasks. Given those statistics—and the fact that even one 
client who chooses to go to trial requires a lot of court time, in addition 
to investigation time—a public defender with that caseload could not 
possibly meet the constitutional standard in every case.  
But these jurisdictions have no incentive to spend money on indigent 
defense in the absence of a costly consequence. And because remedies 
on appeal provide no incentive to comply, states have every incentive to 
shirk these constitutional rights. The critical question, then, is whether 
the system currently provides any other remedies to motivate 
constitutional compliance. 
III.  THE INADEQUACY OF OTHER REMEDIES TO DETER INVISIBLE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR 
If other review mechanisms ensured constitutional compliance, then 
remedies on direct criminal appeal for violations of these invisible errors 
                                                                                                                     
 144. See sources cited supra notes 90–91; see also Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources 
for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 235–36 (2004) 
(recognizing the caseload crisis and advocating for caseload parity between defense counsel and 
prosecutors).  
 145. See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON COURTS, 
STANDARD 13.12 (1973), http://www.nasams.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Standards_For_ 
The_Defense. These standards have been criticized for requiring public defenders to accept too 
many cases, but suffice it to say that even these standards are not being met. 
 146. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 92. 
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would be unnecessary.147 But the alternative mechanisms for remediating 
constitutional harm—the federal and state habeas and constitutional tort 
statutes—restrict remedies even more drastically than direct review of 
convictions. And the ethical rules, which in theory give lawyers and 
judges at least some incentive to comply with the commands of the 
Constitution, turn out to be toothless tigers.  
The Court has recognized that other potential remedies could provide 
sufficient incentives for complying with the Constitution. The four 
remedies most likely to provide incentives for constitutional compliance 
are (1) the post-conviction habeas remedy available in federal courts to 
defendants alleging violations of their constitutional rights at some stage 
of the proceedings leading to conviction;148 (2) federal tort actions, 
primarily the § 1983 civil damages remedies for violation of 
constitutional rights;149 (3) state habeas and tort remedies; and (4) the 
ethical rules governing the conduct of lawyers.150  If any of these remedies 
provided significant relief for constitutional violations, they arguably 
could provide an incentive for constitutional conduct.151 But none does.  
A.  The Federal Habeas Remedy 
Beginning with the habeas remedy, the Judiciary Act of 1789 
provided an equitable remedy to prisoners “in custody, under or by colour 
of the authority of the United States.”152 In keeping with English law, this 
statute authorized relief from confinement where the court imposing 
confinement lacked jurisdiction or where the Executive had detained the 
prisoner without legal process.153 In 1867, Congress authorized federal 
                                                                                                                     
 147. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596–97 (2006) (holding that the exclusionary 
rule remedy for knock and announce violations is not a necessary deterrent because of the 
availability of the § 1983 remedy for such violations).  
 148. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)–(c), 2254–55 (2012). 
 149. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Rudovsky, supra note 71, at 1207–09. 
 150. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.1, 8.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).   
 151. The Constitution does not appear to require any of these remedies (except the very 
limited Bivens remedy), so all of the other remedies have been either enacted by a legislature or 
passed by state bar associations. See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is 
There A Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
862, 908 (1994). 
 152. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. As other scholars note, the federal 
statutory habeas remedy merely supplemented the common law habeas remedy available in state 
courts, and even post-Erie, the federal courts also for many years created a federal “common law” 
of habeas. See, e.g., ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF 
LIBERTY 3 (2001); Stephen I. Vladeck, Common-Law Habeas and the Separation of Powers, 95 
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 43–45 (2010). As discussed below, many of the federal habeas 
gatekeeping bars initially arose as part of that common law tradition. 
 153. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal 
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 486–87 & n.120 
 
31
Hashimoto: Motivating Constitutional Compliance
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1032 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to prisoners in state (as well as 
federal) custody.154 As a result, criminal defendants convicted in either 
state or federal proceedings have an opportunity to seek a remedy in 
federal court to correct federal constitutional errors that occurred during 
the proceedings in their cases.155 
The habeas statute in theory could provide a powerful tool for 
ensuring that state actors respect the constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants. As the Court itself has recognized, however, the habeas 
remedy is so attenuated from constitutional violations that it does not 
affect the conduct of law enforcement officers.156 Perhaps more to the 
point, the habeas statutes pose such significant limitations on relief that it 
is extremely unlikely that the remedy does anything to alter the conduct 
of state actors.  
The federal habeas statutes completely preclude relief for a variety of 
reasons.157 For instance, if the applicant fails to raise his claim within one 
year of the judgment, the federal court cannot grant relief.158 Similarly, 
the defendant must present his constitutional claim to the state courts, 
                                                                                                                     
(1963); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas 
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2041–42 (1992); Emily Garcia Uhrig, A 
Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 575 (2009).  
 154. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; see also McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 478 
(citing and explaining the Act of Feb. 5). 
 155. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)–(c), 2254–55 (2012). 
 156. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94 (1976) (holding that as long as the state 
provided full and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment claim, the habeas statute provides 
no relief for Fourth Amendment violations because the remedy is too far removed from the 
original violation to provide deterrence). 
 157. In addition to the limitations listed below, the statute precludes relief if the applicant 
raises the claim in a second or subsequent application for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)–(b), 
and if the applicant failed to exhaust state remedies for the error. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A) (“An 
application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted unless . . . the applicant has 
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . .”). 
 158. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 419 (2005) (holding 
that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) statute of limitations bars a 
habeas petition that a petitioner files beyond the deadline and that is not entitled to any tolling); 
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 216–17 (2002) (determining that the one-year limit does not 
include time between issuance of the lower court opinion and filing of notice to appeal to a higher 
court for the AEDPA). There are limited exceptions to this bar, including the equitable tolling 
doctrine and the discovery of new evidence that the petitioner could not previously have 
discovered. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1933–34 (2013) (holding that evidence 
that shows “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the 
petitioner]” may bypass the statute of limitations (alteration in original) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 
513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995))); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (holding that the 
AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases). However, 
applicants are rarely successful arguing these exceptions. See Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of 
an Execution: Fairness v. “Process,” 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 317 n.21 (1999) (observing that at 
the time of writing, the author could find no cases that had successfully argued this exception).   
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otherwise it is deemed waived.159 If the state defendant does timely raise 
a claim that the state courts considered and denied, the court cannot grant 
relief unless the applicant can establish that the state court committed an 
error that 
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 
or . . . in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 
in the State court proceeding.160  
As others have documented, this standard presents a significant obstacle 
to applicants’ chances of succeeding on any claim.161 The wisdom of each 
                                                                                                                     
 159. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); see, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012) 
(noting that under the procedural default rules, “a federal court will not review the merits of 
claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner 
failed to abide by a state procedural rule”); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000) 
(discussing the procedural default doctrine generally). The procedural default bar can be excused 
if the applicant can establish both cause for the default and prejudice from the failure to consider 
his claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (restating the cause and prejudice 
standard of review of alleged violations of federal law in habeas proceedings); Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86–87 (1977) (holding that the state procedural default doctrine barred federal 
habeas review absent a showing of cause and prejudice for the default). Suffice it to say that the 
cause and prejudice standard affords only the narrowest exception to the procedural default bar. 
See Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, 49 DUKE L.J. 947, 957–59 (2000); Ruthann Robson & Michael Mello, Ariadne’s 
Provisions: A “Clue of Thread” to the Intricacies of Procedural Default, Adequate and 
Independent State Grounds, and Florida’s Death Penalty, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 96–97 (1988). 
 160. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (holding that 
before a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner, the applicant must 
show either that the state court adjudication “(1) ‘was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or (2) ‘involved an unreasonable 
application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States’” (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012)); see also Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (stating that “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” have 
independent meanings under AEDPA). 
 161. See, e.g.,  NANCY J. KING, ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS 
UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 (EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY) 6 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ pdffiles1/nij/grants/219558.pdf (providing statistics 
on defenses); John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 
292–93 (2006) (arguing that there is uncertainty surrounding the application of these claims); John 
H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 435, 475–77 (2011) (highlighting how the complexity and unyielding nature of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d) encourages dismissal of otherwise meritorious claims); Kenneth Williams, The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong with It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN. 
L. REV. 919, 926–28 (2001) (objecting to courts’ application of § 2254). 
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of these limitations is hotly contested,162 but, wise or not, they continue 
to limit the availability of a habeas remedy in federal court, and as a 
result, they limit the extent to which the potential availability of a habeas 
remedy influences the conduct of state actors.163  
 One additional barrier exists to limit the capacity for the habeas 
remedy to set incentives for state actors. In many jurisdictions, elected 
district attorneys for the local jurisdiction or county prosecute criminal 
defendants,164 but the state’s attorney general’s office represents the state 
in federal habeas actions.165 The fact that the state actor making decisions 
at the defendant’s criminal trial does not represent the state in any 
subsequent habeas action dilutes the impact of any deterrent effect 
provided by the habeas remedy. As a result, the federal habeas remedy 
provides little, if any, incentive for state actors to respect the 
Constitution.166 
B.  Section 1983 Federal Tort Remedies 
Like the federal habeas remedy, the federal tort remedy provided by 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide much incentive for constitutional 
conduct by government actors. Passed over a century ago as part of the 
Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress intended for § 1983 to provide a federal tort 
remedy for plaintiffs whose federal constitutional rights have been 
violated by state or local government employees.167 But like the federal 
                                                                                                                     
 162. See Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in 
Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 771–73 (2002); see also Larry W. 
Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 541, 555–56 (2006) (discussing AEDPA’s controversial infringement on the jurisdictional 
power of federal courts in habeas proceedings).  
 163. Professor Nancy King reports that the overall grant rate for non-capital cases is about 
one in every 341 cases filed. See KING ET AL., supra note 161, at 52.  
 164. See, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 
69, 75–76 (2011) (discussing the history of the locally elected prosecutor in the United States); 
William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of 
Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1343–44 
(1993); Michael J. Ellis, Note, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528, 1530 
(2012). 
 165. See Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed 
Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 27 (2002). 
 166. See KING ET AL., supra note 161, at 51 (showing that in non-capital cases, only 0.29% 
of all federal habeas cases brought received relief). 
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (giving citizens the right to bring suit against “[e]very person 
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory 
or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”); Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal 
Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 483–84, 486 (1982) (tracing the 
history of § 1983 from creation through modern Supreme Court interpretations); Steven L. Winter, 
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habeas remedy, § 1983 has significant limitations that prevent it from 
providing an incentive for constitutional compliance.168  
To prevail on a § 1983 claim for damages, the plaintiff must show, 
fundamentally, that the state violated his constitutional rights and that the 
constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged 
violation.169 If these were the only requirements for the § 1983 remedy, 
it arguably could provide an incentive for state actors to comply with the 
Constitution because it would require that state actors be aware of 
constitutional law and comply with clearly established rights.170  
But the Court has also held that a § 1983 damages remedy for 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment is cognizable only if the 
defendant can establish either that his conviction has been reversed on 
                                                                                                                     
The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 333–34 (1992) (attempting to 
define the scope of the phrase “under the color of law” within the context of § 1983).  
Additionally, there is one other federal tort remedy for constitutional violations committed 
by federal (as opposed to state) employees. Although § 1983 does not provide a remedy for 
constitutional violations by federal officers, the Court has held that federal prisoners seeking 
redress for constitutional violations by federal officers may have a remedy. See Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that the 
petitioner stated a cause of action and was entitled to recover civil damages for federal agents’ 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights). The Bivens remedy, however, has been limited even 
more significantly than any remedy available under § 1983. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct.  
617, 621–22 (2012) (discussing the three narrow situations in which the Bivens remedy extends—
warrantless searches, the Eighth Amendment right to medical treatment, and alleged sexual 
harassment by a federal employee). Bivens, therefore, does not provide an incentive for 
constitutional compliance in criminal cases outside of very limited situations. 
 168. Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and 
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (finding that “[e]xcept for the two relatively small 
classes of cases, voting rights and accommodations, the data show a uniformly low success rate 
at trial across all categories of civil rights and prisoner cases” and that “success rates for the large 
categories (civil rights, employment discrimination, prisoner civil rights) are far below reported 
trial success rates for most other litigation”); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality 
of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 677 (1987) (finding based on empirical 
data that “constitutional tort plaintiffs do significantly worse than non-civil rights litigants in every 
measurable way”).  
 169. See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) (using Harlow’s “clearly established” 
analysis in a § 1983 action); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“If the law at that 
time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate 
subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct 
not previously identified as unlawful.”). 
 170. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19 (“If the law was clearly established, the immunity 
defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law 
governing his conduct.”); Allen H. Denson, Neither Clear Nor Established: The Problem with 
Objective Legal Reasonableness, 59 ALA. L. REV. 747, 756 (2008) (“In order to achieve the 
socially desirable goal of deterring future violations by providing guidance to public officials, 
while at the same time not holding officials liable for violating constitutional rights in novel 
situations, constitutional rights must be recognizable in a more useful sense.”). 
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direct appeal or has otherwise been declared invalid. As the Court put it 
in Heck v. Humphrey171: 
We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not 
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of 
outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages 
actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the 
unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has 
always applied to actions for malicious prosecution. 
. . . .[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other 
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove 
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct 
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a 
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or 
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of 
habeas corpus.172  
As discussed above, obtaining a reversal on appeal or a remedy on habeas 
presents serious obstacles.173  
There is one sense in which § 1983 could provide a remedy—
injunctive relief may be available to criminal defendants facing 
representation by public defenders with astronomically high caseloads.174 
But the outside possibility that injunctive relief may be available to 
criminal defendants who are not receiving adequate representation 
provides little incentive for jurisdictions to comply with their obligations 
to provide effective assistance of counsel. After all, at worst, they will be 
required to come into compliance with no other penalty.175 
The § 1983 remedy, then, stands as a poor mechanism for ensuring 
constitutional compliance. To be sure, the Court could modify the 
requirement that § 1983 plaintiffs establish reversal of their convictions, 
thereby providing greater incentive for constitutional compliance. But the 
value of tort remedies, even if not subject to the limitations discussed 
above, in incentivizing constitutional compliance has significant 
                                                                                                                     
 171. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  
 172. Id. at 486–87 (internal citations omitted).  
 173. See supra Part II and Section III.A.  
 174. A district court in Washington recently found that injunctive relief was available in this 
situation. See Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1133–34 (W.D. Wash. 
2013). 
 175. In Wilbur, the district court’s injunctive relief included an order to hire a part-time 
“public defense supervisor” to oversee the offending public defenders’ efforts to come into 
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limitations. This is so because the actors making decisions resulting in 
constitutional infringements generally cannot be held liable.176 Thus, 
§ 1983 does not, and cannot, provide an incentive for constitutional 
compliance. 
C.  State Habeas and Tort Remedies 
Every state has a post-conviction remedy to correct federal 
constitutional errors.177 As with the remedies described above, if state 
habeas were routinely available to correct any federal constitutional 
errors, it could serve as a powerful incentive for constitutional 
compliance. The habeas remedy in most states, however, has limitations 
similar to (and in some cases even more restrictive than) those applicable 
on federal habeas.  
The Court has held that the Constitution does not require states to 
provide post-conviction remedies for violations of constitutional 
rights,178 but the constitutions of every state afford such a remedy.179 The 
habeas rules in at least some states vary from the federal rules, and the 
Court has held that federal habeas limitations do not necessarily prevent 
states from construing their habeas remedies differently.180 That fact 
notwithstanding, a number of states incorporate bars to relief that are 
similar to the federal habeas limitations.181 Indeed, some states have 
imposed more significant limitations to the habeas remedy than those 
                                                                                                                     
 176. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that public defenders do 
not act “under color of law” for § 1983 purposes); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 
(1976) (holding that absolute immunity protects prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–
55 (1967) (holding that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suits under § 1983).  
 177. Jennifer N. Ide, The Case of Exzavious Lee Gibson: A Georgia Court’s 
(Constitutional?) Denial of a Federal Right, 47 EMORY L.J. 1079, 1093 (1998). The last state to 
recognize a state habeas remedy was Alaska. See Application of House for a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, 352 P.2d 131, 133, 135 (Alaska 1960) (stating that the court’s habeas authority derived 
from the Alaska Statehood Act). 
 178. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (“State collateral proceedings are 
not constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings and serve a different 
and more limited purpose than either the trial or appeal.”); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 
557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief . . . .”). 
 179. Ide, supra note 177, at 1093. 
 180. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 275, 282 (2008) (holding that states are not 
required to follow the Court’s rule barring application of new procedural constitutional rules to 
cases on habeas review). 
 181. See, e.g., DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF 
HANDBOOK WITH FORMS § 3-2, at 191 (2001 ed.) (noting that at the time of writing, thirty-one 
states had a statute of limitations on their primary post-conviction remedy). 
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facing habeas applicants in federal court.182 Thus, although the state 
habeas remedy may provide a slightly more significant deterrent effect 
than federal habeas in several jurisdictions, overall it provides little in the 
way of additional incentive to comply with constitutional norms beyond 
the deterrent value of appellate remedies. 
The Court also has lauded the deterrent value of state tort remedies for 
federal constitutional violations.183 But, like the § 1983 remedy, state tort 
remedies have demanding requirements that frequently act as a barrier to 
relief.184 And as with the § 1983 remedy, states do not appear to permit 
recovery unless the plaintiff can establish that a court overturned his 
conviction on appeal or on habeas.185 As a result, the exceedingly slim 
chance of a state tort remedy likely has little to no impact on the conduct 
of state officers. 
D.  Ethical Rules Governing Lawyers and Judges 
The empirical evidence on compliance with the exclusionary rule 
primarily documents the responsiveness of law enforcement officers to 
remedies, while lawyers (including judges) have responsibility for 
ensuring compliance with Strickland. Lawyers, unlike law enforcement 
officers, have ethical obligations to follow the Constitution.186 As a 
realistic matter, however, ethical rules governing lawyers and judges 
provide little to no additional incentive to protect defendants’ 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.187  
                                                                                                                     
 182. See Ide, supra note 177, at 1094–97; WILKES, supra note 181, § 1-12, at 51 (noting that 
twelve states do not treat newly discovered evidence of innocence as grounds for relief under their 
post-conviction remedy). 
 183. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 624 (2012) (“State tort law . . . can help to deter 
constitutional violations as well as to provide compensation to a violation’s victim.”). 
 184. See Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1449, 1511 (2009) (noting the inadequacy of state tort law remedies because state law claims 
“are subject to state common law and statutory defenses, some of which may be inapplicable or 
preempted in § 1983 actions”).  
 185. WILKES, supra note 181, § 1-6, at 31.  
 186. Every state has a set of ethical rules governing the conduct of lawyers and judges. See 
AM. BAR ASS’N, STATUS OF STATE REVIEW OF PROFESSION CONDUCT RULES (2011), http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/ethics_2000_status_chart.authcheckdam.pdf. 
The precise content of the rules varies somewhat from state to state, but all require compliance 
with the Constitution. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(a) (2004) (citing the duty of an 
attorney to support the Constitution and laws of the United States); MICH. RULES OF PROF. 
CONDUCT 1.2(d) (2015) (“When . . . a client expects assistance not permitted by . . . law, the 
lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations . . . .”); TEX. DISCIPLINARY 
RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT pmbl. 3 (2005) (“[A] lawyer should zealously pursue clients’ interests 
within the bounds of the law.”). 
 187. This is precisely Professor Alschuler’s point. See Alschuler, supra note 68, at 374–75.  
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As an initial matter, although the ethical rules may provide at least 
some incentive for defense counsel to comply with their constitutional 
obligations, public defenders operating in systems in which they (and 
their colleagues) routinely carry overwhelmingly excessive caseloads 
may neither realize the ways in which their representation is deficient nor 
view it as out of the ordinary. Instead, those defenders operate in triage 
mode, simply lacking sufficient time to provide effective assistance to all 
of their clients.188 To put it simply, those lawyers lack the resources to 
worry about ethical rules, let alone comply with them.  
Even if those lawyers recognize that they lack the power to control 
their caseloads, legislators, not defense lawyers, decide the budgets for 
public defenders, and those budgets determine caseloads.189 Indeed, some 
jurisdictions have passed legislation prohibiting public defenders from 
withdrawing from cases on the grounds that they have excessive 
caseloads.190 
The bottom line is that none of the alternative mechanisms for 
ensuring constitutional compliance—state or federal habeas remedies, 
state or federal tort remedies, or the ethical rules—comes close to 
deterring unconstitutional conduct by government actors. As a result, the 
primary mechanism for deterrence remains the constitutional remedy at 
trial or on appeal. 
IV.  REMEDIES TO MOTIVATE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE 
The current remedial scheme does not create adequate incentives for 
constitutional compliance with rights that (1) can be surreptitiously 
violated, and (2) carry a high cost to comply. The result is systematic 
constitutional violations of those rights in at least some jurisdictions.191 
Batson and Strickland represent the paradigmatic examples, although 
others likely exist. Of course, not all jurisdictions violate these 
constitutional rights. Indeed, most respect them. The point is that at least 
some do not.  
To provide an incentive for jurisdictions to comply with high-cost 
constitutional rights like ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court 
therefore should provide remedies for violations of this category of rights 
in cases in which the defendant can establish a pattern or custom of 
                                                                                                                     
 188. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from 
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 821–22 (2004) (arguing that public defenders have 
to perform a triage function and focus only on certain cases because they lack the time to focus 
on all of them). 
 189. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 90, at 421–22. 
 190. See id. at 421–22, 429–30 (noting that Florida and Colorado have passed such 
legislation). 
 191. See supra Section II.C. 
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constitutional violations by the government. Thus, if a defendant can 
establish both that the state did not comply with his constitutional rights 
and that the state has a custom or pattern of intentional disregard for that 
particular constitutional right, the defendant would be entitled to reversal. 
This remedy essentially would treat patterns or customs of intentional 
disregard for the constitutional right as structural error, thereby relieving 
defendants of the obligation to establish harm from the error.192 
The Batson remedy provides a helpful model in two ways. First, as 
the Court has recognized, although proving discriminatory intent often 
proves challenging, evidence that a jurisdiction had a “general policy” of 
excluding black venire members from juries helps establish 
discriminatory intent.193 Thus, evidence that in the decade before the 
defendant’s trial, Dallas County, Texas distributed a training document 
advising prosecutors of the importance of striking people of color from 
the jury venire provided persuasive evidence of discriminatory intent in 
the exercise of peremptory strikes.194 Second, proof of intentional 
discrimination is structural error leading to automatic reversals regardless 
of the strength of evidence against the defendant.195 Thus, prosecutors’ 
offices have a significant incentive to avoid systematic, intentional 
violations of Batson.196  
                                                                                                                     
 192. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986) (treating as structural error claims 
that the state engaged in intentional discrimination in the exercise of preemptory strikes). 
 193. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 334–35 (2003) (documenting the pattern or 
practice of discrimination in Dallas County). The standard for establishing a “policy” under 
Batson appears to be similar to that required to establish a custom of constitutional violations 
sufficient to give rise to municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). See, e.g., Baron v. 
Suffolk Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 402 F.3d 225, 240–42 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that a prison guard 
sufficiently established the county’s custom of violating the First Amendment by retaliating 
against guards who reported colleagues through testimony that the guard was disciplined for his 
reports and evidence from a prison official that the prison had a “code of silence” that “could” 
have consequences for those who violated it). Circuits differ on the precise standard required to 
establish a “custom.” In particular, there is a circuit split regarding whether multiple violations 
against the same plaintiff can constitute a custom or whether, instead, there must be instances of 
multiple violations against different people. Compare id. at 237, 239 (holding that allegations of 
specific violations against one plaintiff could be sufficient), with Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 
588, 594–95 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff alleging failure to protect had to 
establish that the government had a widespread practice of failing to adequately protect inmates).  
 194. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 334–35. To be sure, as discussed above, proving Batson 
violations presents real challenges even with evidence of a general policy of discrimination. But 
that evidence certainly helps establish intentional discrimination. 
 195. See Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161–62 (noting that Batson errors are structural 
and are not subject to harmless error review). 
 196. Id.  
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Intentional, systematic violations of Strickland cry out for a similar 
remedy to provide incentives for constitutional compliance.197 
Jurisdictions nationwide set their budgets for public defender offices 
without regard to whether those lawyers can meet their constitutional 
obligations.198 Because these jurisdictions recognize that courts will not 
reverse convictions based upon otherwise sufficient evidence, even for 
blatant violations of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, 
jurisdictions can, and at least sometimes do, gamble on the extremely 
unlikely probability of reversal.  
Under these unique circumstances—a defendant (1) asserts a difficult 
to detect infringement of a high-cost constitutional right, and (2) presents 
evidence of an intentional custom or pattern of conduct by the state 
infringing on that constitutional right—the existing remedies for criminal 
defendants are insufficient to ensure that states comply with their 
constitutional obligations. Constitutional compliance therefore requires a 
more robust appellate remedy. Thus, courts should “presume” Strickland 
prejudice upon a showing that a jurisdiction had a practice of under-
funding indigent defense so drastically that it would be impossible for 
lawyers to effectively represent all of their clients.199 Of course, 
defendants still would have to establish deficient performance by their 
lawyers, i.e., “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.”200 But upon a showing of deficient performance, prejudice 
would be presumed if the defendant could establish that the jurisdiction 
had a custom or pattern of providing counsel who do not—and cannot— 
function as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Nor would such a presumption of prejudice be unprecedented. The 
Court already has recognized certain exceptions to the prejudice 
                                                                                                                     
 197. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving 
Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
45, 93 (2005) (observing that although the conviction reversal remedy might not provide an 
incentive for low-level prosecutors to comply with the Constitution, “[c]onviction reversals may 
be particularly appropriate in situations where the misconduct involved stems from internal 
policies and procedures that require modification through top-down change. For instance, where 
the misconduct is found to be a product of inadequate training or supervision, or where the 
offending prosecutor is found to have acted in accordance with internal agency policies, an 
inherently personal sanction will not inspire agency-wide change”).   
 198. See Anderson, supra note 90, at 422.  
 199. See supra Section II.A (setting forth patterns of excessive caseloads in jurisdictions 
around the country and the difficulties arising from those caseloads). 
 200. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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requirements that focus on the blameworthiness of the state’s conduct.201 
For instance, the Court has recognized that Strickland prejudice can be 
presumed where the trial court requires the defendant to proceed with a 
lawyer who has an actual conflict of interest,202 and where, although the 
state provided a lawyer, the lawyer could not provide effective 
assistance.203 Presuming prejudice from intentional patterns of 
constitutional non-compliance therefore has precedent. 
To be sure, requiring defendants to establish a deliberate pattern of 
violations creates a difficult burden of proof (just as proving Batson 
discriminatory intent presents challenges). And if jurisdictions believe 
that there is no chance that a defendant will be entitled to relief, this 
standard will not provide an incentive for constitutional compliance. But 
two factors tailor this remedy to creating a stronger incentive for 
constitutional compliance. First, this remedy focuses almost entirely on 
the conduct of the state, rather than the evidence against the defendant. 
As a result, it provides states with incentives to ensure that their conduct 
falls outside of the deliberate custom standard. Second, and of particular 
importance, the stakes of walking too close to the constitutional line (or, 
in the words of the Court, “tacking too close to the wind”) are incredibly 
high.204 After all, once one defendant has established a pattern or custom 
of deliberate violations, all other defendants in that jurisdiction have a 
right to reversal upon a showing of a constitutional deprivation of that 
right. Jurisdictions therefore have an incentive to err on the side of 
constitutional caution.  
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s scheme of remedies provides incentives for compliance 
with most constitutional rights. But for high-cost, low-risk-of-reversal 
rights such as Strickland, the Court’s remedial scheme does not provide 
sufficient incentives to deter unconstitutional conduct. The result has 
been deliberate and systematic infringements on the constitutional rights 
of defendants in at least some jurisdictions. Unfortunately, those 
constitutional infringements likely will not end without some incentive 
                                                                                                                     
 201. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678–80 & n.9 (1985) (observing that 
the state’s deliberate withholding of the fact that its witness has committed perjury is subject to 
review for harmless error rather than materiality); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659–60 
(1984) (recognizing that the Court can presume prejudice where, “although counsel is available 
to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could 
provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without 
inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial”). 
 202. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). 
 203. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–60. 
 204. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439–40 (1995) (noting in the context of Brady that 
“a prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of 
evidence. . . . [t]his is as it should be”). 
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encouraging constitutional compliance. The Court therefore should 
devise a remedy focused on incentivizing constitutional compliance for 
these rights. The Constitution demands nothing less. 
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